Del. Cia Price

Commending Daphne Tamara Fulson.

Commending Feeding Southwest Virginia.

Commending the Honorable M. Kirkland Cox.

Facial recognition technology; authorizationof use by local law-enforcement agencies and public institutionsof higher education. Allows a locality or a public institutionof higher education to authorize a local law-enforcement agency orcampus police department to purchase or deploy facial recognitiontechnology, which is defined in the bill. The bill prohibits a locallaw-enforcement agency or public institution of higher education currentlyusing facial recognition technology from continuing to use suchtechnology without such authorization after July 1, 2021.

Unemployment compensation; failure to respond; continuation of benefits; repayment of overpayments. Provides that an employer shall be deemed to have established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to written requests for information relating to claims if the Virginia Employment Commission determines that the employer has failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request for information relating to a claim on two or more occasions within a 48-month window and requires such employer to pay a penalty upon his second such failure to respond timely or adequately. Under current law, such pattern is established after four failures, and the penalty is assessed after the third failure. The bill provides that if an employer fails to respond timely or adequately to a written request by the Commission for information relating to a claim, the employer forfeits any appeal rights to that claim. The bill provides that when a claimant has begun receiving unemployment benefits, such benefits shall continue to be paid under a presumption of continuing entitlement unless or until a deputy determines, in a process providing notice and opportunity to be heard to the claimant, that the claimant is ineligible or disqualified. The bill provides that an individual who receives an overpayment of unemployment benefits is not liable to repay the overpayments to the Commission if the Commission determines that (i) the overpayment was not due to fraud, misrepresentation, or willful nondisclosure on the part of the recipient and its recovery would be against equity and good conscience; (ii) the overpayment was a direct result of inducement, solicitation, or coercion on the part of the employer; or (iii) the overpayment occurred due to administrative error. The bill requires the Commission to waive an overpayment of benefits under a federal unemployment benefit program if the program authorizes the waiver. The bill provides that any person who receives an overpayment of benefits is not required to repay such overpayment if the Commission determines that the overpayment was made because the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to a written request by the Commission for information relating to the claim. Finally, the bill prohibits a determination with respect to benefit overpayments to be issued until after a determination or decision that finds a claimant ineligible or disqualified for benefits previously paid has become final.

Criminal proceedings; consideration of mental condition and intellectual and developmental disabilities. Permits the admission of evidence concerning a defendant's mental condition at the time of an alleged offense, including expert testimony, if such evidence (i) tends to show the defendant did or did not have the specific mental state required for the offense charged and (ii) is otherwise admissible pursuant to the general rules of evidence. The bill provides that to establish a mental condition for such purposes, the defendant must show that his condition existed at the time of the offense and that such condition satisfies the diagnostic criteria for (a) an autism spectrum disorder as defined in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association or (b) an intellectual or developmental disability. If a defendant intends to present such evidence, the bill requires him or his counsel to give notice in writing to the attorney for the Commonwealth within specified time periods. The bill also clarifies that a diagnosis of an intellectual or developmental disability shall be considered by a judicial officer for the purpose of rebuttal of a presumption against bail and that a court may order that a sentencing report prepared by a probation officer contain any diagnosis of an intellectual or developmental disability. The bill also adds to the requirements to be met for qualification as a court-appointed attorney two hours of continuing legal education, which shall cover the representation of individuals with behavioral or mental health disorders and individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities.

Child support obligations; party's incarcerationnot deemed voluntary unemployment or underemployment. Providesthat a party's incarceration for 180 or more consecutive days shall not ordinarily be deemed voluntary unemployment or underemployment for the purposes of calculating child support and imputing incomefor such calculation. The bill further provides that a party's incarcerationfor 180 or more days shall be a material change of circumstancesupon which a modification of a child support order may be based.

Probation, revocation, and suspension of sentence; limitations. Limits the amount of active incarceration a court can impose as a result of a revocation hearing for a probation violation. The bill provides that if the court finds the basis of a violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation is that the defendant was convicted of a criminal offense or violated another condition other than a technical violation, the court may pronounce whatever sentence might have been originally imposed. The bill defines "technical violation" and provides specific limitations on the sentence a court may impose depending on whether the violation is a first, second, or third or subsequent technical violation. The bill also provides that a court may fix the period of probation for up to the statutory maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned and any period of supervised probation shall not exceed five years from the release of the defendant from any active period of incarceration. The bill also provides that a court must measure any period of suspension of sentence from the date of entry of the original sentencing order.