Stopping Harmful Incidents to Enforce Lawful Drone Use Act or the SHIELD U Act This bill authorizes and expands counter-drone activities by state, local, and airport law enforcement, and federal agencies. Specifically, the bill authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state, local, and airport law enforcement to carry out Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (Counter-UAS) activities on commercial service airport property to detect, identify, and mitigate threats posed by unmanned aircraft (i.e., drones). Further, the bill authorizes state and local law enforcement to carry out Counter-UAS activities off commercial airport property; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must establish a process that allows for collaboration and coordination with these entities. In addition, each commercial airport must convene a task force to establish or modify the airport's tactical response plan for drone threats. The FAA and Transportation Security Administration must also publish (and update annually) best practices guidance on Counter-UAS activities at commercial service airports. The bill also allows DHS and the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Energy to contract with other entities to carry out authorized Counter-UAS activities. Further, the bill amends restrictions on the use of radio frequency jamming technology to allow state, local, and airport law enforcement to use the technology to detect, identify, or mitigate a drone threat. Finally, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers must develop and implement training curricula on the use of Counter-UAS activities. The training must be available to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement, as well as private sector security agencies.
Traveler Privacy Protection Act of 2025 This bill limits the use of facial recognition or matching technology (e.g., matching and identification software) in airports for passenger screening. In general, the bill restricts the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) use of the technology to performing passenger identity verification at airport screening locations. The TSA must notify passengers prior to each use of the technology and receive affirmative express consent. If a passenger opts out of the use of the technology, then the TSA must perform identity verification using an approved identification document (e.g., a state driver's license) without collecting biometric information (e.g., fingerprints). For a passenger using a trusted traveler program (e.g., Global Entry), the TSA must provide notice on the use of the technology at the time of program enrollment and renewal and as the passenger approaches the point of identity verification. The passenger must have the option to opt out. The bill prohibits the TSA from (1) subjecting a passenger who opts out of the screening to discriminatory treatment or less favorable screening conditions; (2) using the technology to track or identify passengers outside of the screening location or to enable systemic, indiscriminate, or wide-scale monitoring, surveillance, or tracking; and (3) sharing biometric information collected through the use of the technology. The bill also limits the amount of time that the TSA may store the information collected. Further, these restrictions and requirements apply to the TSA's use of the technology in other specified circumstances (e.g., employee screenings).
The LANDED Act establishes a federal framework for state and local law enforcement to use counter-drone technology to address unauthorized drone operations that threaten public safety, national security, or critical infrastructure. It creates a process for states to apply for authorization to deploy approved counter-UAS systems, with requirements for reporting after use, coordination with federal agencies, and safety protocols. The bill also creates a grant program to help states acquire counter-drone equipment and mandates a reporting system for drone operations to prevent conflicts between agencies. It specifies that law enforcement can use counter-drone technology to detect, track, and disrupt drones, but must verify threats before use and report after any action.
The Advancing Quantum Manufacturing Act of 2025 requires the Department of Energy and National Science Foundation to coordinate their quantum research through a dedicated liaison and cover a broad range of quantum technologies, including computing, sensing, and enabling tools like lasers and cryogenics. It directs the Commerce Department to establish a new Manufacturing USA institute focused on scaling up quantum manufacturing - providing end-to-end capabilities for design, fabrication, testing, and workforce development in quantum computing, sensing, and communication systems. The bill also mandates two studies: one by the National Academies to assess progress in the National Quantum Initiative Program, and another to identify collaboration barriers between research centers, industry, and academia. These provisions aim to accelerate domestic quantum technology production for national security and economic competitiveness.
Defending Defense Research from Chinese Communist Party Espionage Act of 2025 This bill generally prohibits contracts between certain foreign entities and institutions of higher education that are conducting research funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), and it imposes a post-employment restriction on principal investigators of certain DOD-funded research projects. Beginning on January 1, 2027, the bill generally prohibits institutions of higher education that conduct DOD-funded research from entering into contracts with North Korea, China, Russia, or Iran or a foreign entity of concern (e.g., an academic institution of China that meets certain criteria). DOD is prohibited from providing funds to such institutions unless the institution receives a waiver. Institutions seeking to contract with the listed countries or entities, and those with existing contracts, must submit waiver requests to DOD. Waivers are valid for one year. Institutions with contracts that are longer than one year may apply to renew the waiver for an additional one-year period. The bill also generally imposes a post-employment restriction on individuals who serve as principal investigators of certain defense research projects, unless DOD waives the restriction. Specifically, for the 10 years following their employment as a principal investigator, an individual may not seek or accept employment or conduct any activity for which a foreign entity of concern provides compensation. This applies to principal investigators of projects that are (1) operated by an institution of higher education; (2) funded by DOD; and (3) involve a critical or emerging technology, as determined by DOD.
This bill imposes increasing tariffs on Chinese-made drones (starting at 30% and rising to 50%+ over four years) and creates a fund using these tariff revenues. The fund provides grants to first responders (60% of funds), farmers/ranchers (20%), and critical infrastructure providers (20%) to purchase secure drones made outside China. It also requires certification that drones don’t contain Chinese components for importation after 2031. The bill directly affects drone importers, first responders, farmers, and infrastructure providers by reshaping drone procurement and supply chains.
The Financial Technology Protection Act of 2025 creates a new government working group to study how terrorists and criminals use digital assets (like cryptocurrencies) and emerging technologies for illicit activities. The group, composed of federal agencies (Treasury, FBI, Justice, Homeland Security, etc.) and private sector representatives from fintech, blockchain, and privacy organizations, will research threats and develop proposals to strengthen anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism efforts. It must submit annual reports to Congress for four years, detailing findings and recommendations, and will terminate after that period. The bill also requires the President to submit a public report within 180 days on how foreign actors might exploit digital assets to evade sanctions, along with a strategy to prevent such misuse.
HR 4759, the "Ban Military Drones Spying on Civilians Act," prohibits federal agencies (including DHS and the military) from using military-grade drones to surveil U.S. citizens participating in protests or civil disobedience. It bans the use of funds for operating covered drones - like the MQ-9 Reaper or high-altitude military drones - within the U.S. for this purpose. The bill also requires annual reports detailing any drone use, including justification, locations, equipment, and whether U.S. persons were identified, to Congress. This directly affects how federal agencies deploy surveillance technology during public demonstrations. The law aims to prevent military drone surveillance of civilians during protests, focusing on concrete policy restrictions rather than outcomes.
This bill requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to partner with private sector stakeholders to identify high-growth emerging tech industries (like AI and semiconductors) and relevant training programs for veterans. It mandates the VA to prominently include these opportunities in veterans' transition programs and on its website, and to create a 90-day expedited process for approving qualifying education courses. The bill also updates existing VA programs by replacing "high technology" with "high technology or emerging technology" in key sections, ensuring emerging tech fields are explicitly included. The provisions expire on September 30, 2027.
S 2277, the GPS Resiliency Report Act, requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress within one year of the bill's enactment. The report must assess risks to U.S. and allied access to GPS during conflicts or attacks, evaluate competitor nations' capabilities to disrupt GPS (including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), and review current efforts to develop backup navigation systems (like space-based and quantum sensing technologies). It also mandates a framework for a terrestrial-based GPS redundancy system operational within 15 years. The bill directly affects the Department of Defense (as the preparer) and Congress (as the recipient), focusing solely on requiring this analysis without changing existing policies.
