Criminal procedure: discrimination.

Section 745(c)(3) now requires that when a represented defendant files a motion alleging a violation based on the conduct of one or more law enforcement officers, the attorney must serve a copy of the motion on the employing law enforcement agency. This gives agencies notice and an opportunity to respond before a hearing is held.

The old Section 745(c)(3) (requiring the court to make findings on the record at the conclusion of a hearing) was renumbered as (c)(4) to accommodate the new paragraph. This is a conforming change with no policy impact.

Formatting changes consistent with the enrolled-to-chaptered conversion: addition of 'STATE OF CALIFORNIA AUTHENTICATED ELECTRONIC LEGAL MATERIAL' header, Chapter 721 designation, governor approval date (October 13, 2025), and updated page numbering. No policy impact.

The full chaptered bill text (all sections amending Penal Code 745, 1473, and 1473.7) was removed from the document.

Website interface elements were added, including navigation links, search fields, a version selector showing prior bill versions (09/16/25 Enrolled through 02/20/25 Introduced), publication date (10/14/2025), and page metadata.

Removed all prior amendment history headers (dates from June 13 through September 5, 2025) and replaced them with a single enrolled-bill header showing passage dates and clerk signatures.

Added 'Passed the Assembly September 13, 2025' and 'Passed the Senate September 11, 2025' lines with corresponding clerk designations, plus a blank line for the Governor's receipt date and time.

Reformatted the bill text by removing inline line numbers, changing page header style from 'AB 1071 -N-' to 'AB 1071 -N-', and repositioning the legislative counsel's digest to appear after the short title rather than before it.

Section 745(b)(1) changed from covering defendants whose 'sentence has not been imposed or who is before the trial court for any remand or resentencing proceeding' to covering any defendant 'whose judgment is not final,' broadening the group eligible to file motions in trial court.

Section 745(b)(3) removed the word 'incarcerated' from 'An incarcerated defendant whose sentence is final may file a petition,' so that any defendant (not just incarcerated ones) can file a post-conviction petition under Section 1473.2 or subdivision (d) of Section 1473.

Section 745(b)(2) added the explicit statement that 'Record-based claims raised on direct appeal shall not be subject to waiver,' protecting defendants from losing RJA claims on appeal due to procedural timing issues.

Section 745(e)(1) changed from requiring the court to impose 'any of the following remedies' to 'any one of or a combination of the following applicable remedies,' and added 'or vacate the conviction and order a new trial' as an option alongside declaring a mistrial.

Section 745(e)(2) replaced the standard 'substantive reduction in sentence' with 'meaningful modification of judgment' for alternative remedies, which is broader and not limited to sentence length reductions.

Section 745(e)(2)(B) changed from requiring the court to impose 'either of the following remedies' (one or the other) to 'any one of or a combination of the following remedies, unless the defense requests or the parties stipulate to an alternative remedy, that results in a meaningful modification of judgment.'

Section 745(e)(2)(C) removed the limitation that the sentence-only remedy applies only when the violation 'is based on paragraph (4) of subdivision (a),' so it now applies whenever only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of the RJA.

The bill's title was expanded to include Section 1473.7 among the sections being amended, and the legislative digest was revised to describe the bill as providing 'an additional procedure for a defendant whose judgment is not final' rather than simply listing procedures applicable to various categories of defendants.

Section 745(h) added language clarifying that the definitions in that subdivision also apply to 'claims under this section raised in subdivision (d) of Section 1473 and in petitions filed pursuant to Section 1473.2,' ensuring consistent interpretation across post-conviction proceedings.

Multiple cross-references were updated: 'Section 1473.7' was changed to 'Section 1473.2' in several applicability provisions (subdivision (j)), and 'subdivision (e) of Section 1473' was changed to 'subdivision (d) of Section 1473,' reflecting renumbering in the habeas corpus statute.

The findings and declarations now state that the threshold for appointing counsel to indigent postconviction litigants is a 'plausible claim' of an RJA violation, explicitly rejecting a prima facie showing requirement and citing McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33. This lowers the bar for defendants to obtain court-appointed counsel in RJA cases.

The sentence 'Record-based claims raised on direct appeal shall not be subject to waiver' was deleted from Section 745(b)(2). Previously, this guaranteed that a defendant could raise an RJA claim based on the trial record at any point on direct appeal without risking waiver. Its removal means such claims may now be forfeited if not timely raised.

The legislative counsel's digest was expanded to note that the bill authorizes defendants to file a motion for disclosure of all relevant evidence related to a potential RJA violation, and that courts may impose any other remedy not prohibited by another law. The digest also notes 'other technical changes.'

Various typos were corrected throughout the text, including 'may may' changed to 'may,' 'sentence and sentence' changed to 'sentence,' and a duplicated 'defendant.' was cleaned up in the stay-and-remand provision. Page numbering shifted from 96 to 95.

A defendant whose judgment is not final may now only file a motion in the trial court prior to filing a notice of appeal. Previously, the language was broader, covering any defendant whose sentence had not been imposed or who was before the trial court for remand or resentencing.

For appellate courts granting a stay and remand on direct appeal, the amendment adds a new requirement: the defendant must allege a plausible claim for relief. Previously, only an attestation that the violation needed further development through no fault of the defendant was required.

The separate procedure under Section 1473.7 for nonincarcerated defendants with final sentences is eliminated. All post-conviction racial justice claims are now consolidated under Section 1473.2 or subdivision (d) of Section 1473, regardless of whether the defendant is incarcerated.

The applicability timeline in subdivision (j) removes all references to Section 1473.7, so the phased expansion of eligibility (death penalty and immigration cases from 2023, state prison and county jail inmates from 2024, felony convictions from 2025, all cases from 2026) now operates solely through Sections 1473.2 and 1473(d).

Remedy language is simplified throughout: 'lower sentence' is changed to 'lesser sentence,' and references to remedies being 'available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law' are shortened to 'any other lawful remedy.' The digest is also revised to remove the phrase 'specifically provide multiple procedures applicable to.'

Consolidated two separate remedy subdivisions (e) into one unified structure. Before judgment, added 'grant judicial diversion to the defendant' as a remedy option and added a catch-all provision allowing any other lawful remedy under federal or state law.

For post-judgment conviction violations based on paragraphs (1) or (2) of subdivision (a), added language allowing the defense to request or parties to stipulate to an alternative remedy that results in a substantive sentence reduction, rather than mandating vacatur and new proceedings in all cases.

For post-judgment violations based on paragraph (3) (more serious charges), changed from 'the court may modify the judgment' to 'the court shall impose either of the following remedies,' making relief mandatory rather than discretionary.

For post-judgment sentencing-only violations based on paragraph (4), added that the court shall vacate and resentence 'unless the defense requests or the parties stipulate to an alternative remedy,' referencing the alternatives listed in subparagraph (A).

Added new standalone subdivision (l) stating: 'If the court finds there has been a violation of subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.' Previously this was embedded within the remedy section.

Consolidated two separate habeas corpus subdivisions (e) in Section 1473 into a single subdivision (d) with expanded procedures, including detailed evidentiary hearing rules, remote appearance options for petitioners, and a provision that if the state declines to show cause or concedes a violation, the presumption of relief applies.

Added new subdivision (f) to Section 1473 establishing that if the district attorney or Attorney General concedes or stipulates to a factual or legal basis for habeas relief, there is a presumption in favor of granting relief, which can only be overcome if the record contradicts the concession.

Added new subdivision (g) to Section 1473 allowing postconviction counsel to be appointed as retrial counsel if both the petitioner and counsel agree and the counsel is qualified to handle trials, with payment under the applicable pay scale.

Added entirely new Section 1473.2 to the Penal Code creating a dedicated petition process for persons whose conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of Section 745, filed with the court that sentenced the petitioner and served on the district attorney.