Sen. Kyle Gay

This Act removes the registration of trade names for sole proprietorships, partnerships, and associations in the Superior Court prothonotaries and places registration of such trade names with the Division of Revenue. Additionally, this Act provides that the filing of certificates will be recorded electronically and the fee for such filing is $25.00. Under Superior Court Civil R. 77(h), the current filing fee is $25.00. This change updates the statute consistent with the current fee collected by the Superior Court.

This Act strengthens the current practice of obtaining service letters for employment in child care facilities to protect children from workers who have engaged in prior acts that are prohibited by the Office of Child Care Licensing. The Act does all of the following: 1. Requires service letters used for child care facilities ask previous employers whether they would have any concerns about the employee providing care to children. 2. Requires service letters used for child care facilities ask previous employers whether the employee was ever warned, reprimanded, suspended, or discharged for any violations found in the Department of Education's Regulations for Early Care and Education and School-Age Centers. 3. Requires the Office of Child Care Licensing to report any suspected failure of an employer to adhere to the requirements of a service letter to the Department of Labor for review and possible civil penalties. 4. Clarifies the Department of Labor is the only party that can seek civil enforcement under this section. 5. Makes technical corrections to conform existing law to the standards of the Delaware Legislative Drafting Manual.

This Act adopts the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 2023 (UHCDA 2023) to supersede the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 1993, which Delaware enacted in 1996. The UHCDA 2023 was authored by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) and was developed in a multiyear collaborative and non-partisan process to modernize and expand on the 1993 version of the act. The UHCDA 2023 maintains processes to address how health-care decisions can be made by or on behalf of individuals who lack capacity, including: (1) Allowing individuals to appoint agents to make health-care decisions for them should they become unable to make those decisions for themselves. (2) Allowing individuals to provide their health-care professionals and agents with instructions about their values and priorities regarding their health care and to indicate medical treatment they do or do not wish to receive. (3) Authorizing certain people to make health-care decisions for individuals incapable of making their own decisions, but who have not appointed agents. (4) Setting forth agent, default surrogate, and health-care professional rights and duties. The UHCDA 2023 reflects substantial changes in how health care is delivered, increases in non-traditional familial relationships and living arrangements, the proliferation of the use of electronic documents, the growing use of separate advance directives exclusively for mental health care, and other recent developments. Some updates to the Act include: (1) Removal of administrative barriers that make the creation of an advance health-care directive more difficult. (2) Addition of provisions to guide determinations of incapacity, which is important because an agent’s or default surrogate’s (surrogate’s) authority to make health-care decisions for a patient typically commences when the patient lacks capacity to make decisions. The Act modernizes the definition of capacity so that it accounts for the functional abilities of an individual and clarifies that the individual may lack capacity to make one decision but retains capacity to make other decisions. (3) Authorizing the use of advance directives exclusively for mental health care. (4) Modernizing default surrogate provisions that allow family members and certain other people close to a patient to make decisions in the event the patient lacks capacity and has not appointed a health-care agent. The new default surrogate provisions update the priority list in the 1993 Act to reflect a broader array of relationships and family structures. They also provide additional options to address disagreements among default surrogates who have equal priority. (5) Clarifying the duties and powers of surrogates. For example, to reduce the likelihood that an individual’s health-care needs will go unmet due to financial barriers, the Act authorizes a surrogate to apply for health insurance for a patient who does not have another fiduciary authorized to do so. (6) Modernizing the optional model form to be readily understandable and accessible to diverse populations. The form gives individuals the opportunity to readily share information about their values and goals for medical care. Thus, it addresses a common concern raised by health-care professionals in the context of advance planning: that instructions included in advance directives often focus exclusively on preferences for particular treatments, and do not provide health-care professionals or surrogates with the type of information about patients’ goals and values that could be used to make value-congruent decisions when novel or unexpected situations arise. The form addresses these concerns by providing options for individuals to indicate goals and values, in addition to specific treatment preferences. This Act also adopts some of the optional provisions suggested by the ULC, including that an agent or surrogate has limited ability to consent to the long-term placement of an individual in a nursing home without express authorization. Specifically, without express authorization, the agent or surrogate may not consent to the placement for more than 100 days over the individual’s contemporaneous objection unless (1) no alternative living arrangement is reasonably feasible or (2) the individual is terminally ill. The ULC suggested 100 days in recognition that the federal Medicare program covers up to 100 days of nursing home care for qualified beneficiaries. This Act does not authorize mercy killing, assisted suicide, or euthanasia. In addition to style changes throughout, this Act makes some modifications to the UHCDA 2023 that are consistent with Act and should not disrupt uniform interpretation. These modifications include: (1) Revising language to conform to Delaware court practices. (2) Providing surrogates with the authority to file insurance or benefit claims on behalf of the individual and to appeal such outcomes, in addition to the UHCDA 2023 allowance for a surrogate to apply for insurance or benefits on behalf of the individual. As under the UHCDA 2023, a surrogate does not have the duty to perform these actions and may only do so if no other fiduciary is authorized to do so. (3) Creating an additional disqualification that disallows a potential surrogate from serving if the individual has a pending Protection From Abuse petition against the potential surrogate, the individual has a Protection From Abuse order against the potential surrogate, or the potential surrogate is the subject of a civil or criminal order prohibiting or limiting contact with the individual. Section 2 of this Act adds a new Chapter 25B to the Delaware Code. Chapter 25B will contain Delaware-specific supplements to the UHCDA 2023. These Delaware-specific additions are being placed within their own chapter to promote uniform interpretation of the UHCDA 2023. Chapter 25B includes § 2502B, which relates to health-care institution authorization to petition for guardianship for an individual to whom the institution is providing care. Section 2502B reinforces the work of the Non-Acute Medical Guardianship Task Force, created by Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 30 by the 150th General Assembly. That task force’s work resulted in the current § 2519 of Title 16, which offers a process and timeline whereby health-care institutions can take steps to help obtain a guardianship for patients who no longer require acute care and can be transferred to another type of health-care setting. While § 2502B retains the ability for a health-care institution to address the discharge of long-term stay patients without an authorized decisionmaker, it modifies the powers in the current § 2519 by doing all of the following: (1) Allowing health-care institutions to petition of the appointment of a guardian in instances beyond where an individual no longer needs acute care. (2) Reiterating that the health-care institution may only petition if they believe there is no less restrictive alternative that will meet the individual’s needs. (3) Streamlining notice requirements and changing who must receive these notices so that a health-care institution does not send a notice if there is a reasonably available surrogate. If there is a reasonably available surrogate and there is a dispute between the surrogate and the health-care institution about the treatment or level of care needed by an individual, then the parties should seek judicial relief under § 2526 of the UHCDA 2023 as opposed to using the guardianship process. The new Chapter 25B also contains a provision to encourage public awareness and use of advance mental health-care directives. Sections 3 through 11 of this Act update the Delaware Code in light of the adoption of the UHCDA 2023 by updating internal citations, updating terms to match the terms used in the UHCDA 2023, and ensuring a consistent list of default surrogate decisionmakers. This Act is effective immediately and is to be implemented 1 year from the date of enactment.

This Act adopts the Uniform Special Deposits Act (“the Act”) authored by the Uniform Law Commission. The Uniform Law Commission “provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.” The Act was adopted by the Uniform Law Commission in October 2023 and has been adopted in 2 states and introduced in 3 other states. The Act addresses deposits at a bank where the identity of the person entitled to payment is not determined until the occurrence of a contingency identified at the time that the deposit is created. An example of such an account is an escrow account holding funds that will be paid to one of two potential beneficiaries depending on the outcome of a contingency. Although such accounts are commonly used, the legal protections afforded them are uncertain. The fundamental purpose of the Uniform Special Deposits Act is to provide a vehicle that banks and their customers can elect to use providing greater legal certainty that the expectations of users will be respected. The Act provides a mechanism those that elect to be covered by the Act can use to avoid case law applied to special deposits that is murky and in some ways outdated in the context of modern banking. In determining whether a person is engaged in the business of banking to be considered a bank for purposes of the Act, the business of banking is intended to be construed broadly to include persons that may engage in limited functions that are part of or incidental to the business of banking, such as a trust company that engages in fiduciary and agency activities and has the power and authority to accept a special deposit. This Act takes effect on January 1, 2025.

This Act amends the Delaware Antitrust Act (“DAA”) (Chapter 21, Title 6 of the Code) to provide indirect purchasers who have been harmed by violations of the Delaware Antitrust Act the ability to sue for damages. Indirect purchasers of a product or service in the chain of distribution are often the ones who bear the burden of any overcharges from antitrust violations such as price-fixing. Direct purchasers and others in the chain of distribution of the affected product or service often have the ability to pass the overcharge through the chain of distribution to end users. This will align Delaware with at least 36 other states which currently allow for a cause of action for damages for indirect purchasers. Often, end users who make purchases in Delaware, primarily Delaware residents and businesses, are excluded from making claims against multimillion dollar settlement funds set up to compensate indirect purchasers for transactions made in other states that do authorize lawsuits for damages for indirect purchasers. To avoid complicated proof issues related to the pass through of any overcharge through the chain of distribution of a product or service, the Act creates a presumption that any overcharge paid by the first purchaser as a result of a violation of the DAA is passed through to the end user. Also, to simplify issues of proof, the Act provides a plaintiff may elect 25% of the consideration paid for the goods or services in connection with the transaction affected by an illegal restraint of trade as an alternative liquidated damage amount to actual harm. To allow Delaware consumers and businesses to fully take advantage of the remedies provided by this Act, the Act creates a private right of action. Delaware is one of only 2 states that do not provide for a private right of action under their state antitrust law of general applicability. Currently, only the Attorney General has a right to bring actions under the DAA and the Attorney General does not have the resources to review or participate in every national antitrust action. This will ensure Delaware indirect purchasers receive the benefits of private enforcement of the DAA. Section 2 of the Act creates a Delaware state law equivalent to Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the federal antitrust statute, which establishes three offenses commonly termed “monopolization,” “attempted monopolization,” and “conspiracy to monopolize.” Delaware is only 1 of 9 states that does not have a state law equivalent to Section 2 of the Sherman Act and its addition to the DAA is needed to ensure the remedies under the DAA including a right of recovery for indirect purchasers are available to the Attorney General and to Delaware consumers and businesses. Section 3 of the Act modifies the confidentiality restrictions of materials produced to the Attorney General pursuant to an investigative demand. It would allow for the materials to be shared with the Attorney General’s agents such as consultants, experts, electronic discovery platform vendors and economists which would be necessary for the Attorney General to decide on whether the law has been violated and how best to remedy the violation. The Act would also allow the Attorney General to share materials produced pursuant to an investigative demand with federal or state law enforcement officers that agree to keep the information confidential and use it only for official law enforcement purposes. Likewise, the Act requires the Attorney General to keep materials provided by other law enforcement officers received under similar process confidential. These provisions will make it easier for the Attorney General to work together with other federal and state law enforcers in enforcing state and federal antitrust laws. Section 4 of the Act provides an alternative calculation for civil penalties for violations of the Delaware Antitrust Act. Under certain facts and circumstances, the current maximum penalty for a violation of the DAA may be lower than the amount of the gain a violator may obtain by violating the DAA making any penalty a cost of doing business and an insufficient deterrent to violate the law. The alternative calculation provides for an assessment of a civil penalty of up to twice the gross gain or loss associated with the violation. This is like the alternative method for calculating federal criminal fines for the same conduct. Section 4 also authorizes a Court to award investigative costs, expert witness fees, and attorneys’ fees to the Attorney General when the Attorney General successfully brings a law enforcement action to enforce the DAA. Currently, a Court may only award attorney’s fees and expert costs to the Attorney General when the Attorney General brings an action on behalf of a public body or natural persons. Section 5 of the Act creates a right for indirect purchasers who have been harmed by violations of the DAA to sue for damages. It creates a presumption that overcharges paid by the first purchaser as a result of such violations are passed to the end user, and allows a plaintiff to seek liquidated damages in the amount of 25% of the consideration paid, as an alternative to seeking damages for actual harm incurred. Section 6 of the Act clarifies that the Court of Chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of all state court actions or proceedings under the DAA. The Act also makes several clarifications throughout the DAA to recognize it is often federal courts exercising supplemental jurisdiction deciding claims arising under the DAA.

This Act requires crisis pregnancy centers in this state to provide notice if the center is not licensed by this state as a medical facility and does not have a licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises, in person, the provision of services. A violation of this Act is an unlawful practice under § 2513 of Title 6 and a violation of Subchapter II, Chapter 25 of Title 6.

Like Senate Bill No. 301, this Act, Senate Substitute No. 1 for Senate Bill No. 301 requires public universities in this state to provide access to medication for the termination of pregnancy and emergency contraception. The medication and contraception must be provided on-site, but consultation to provide them may be performed by a provider at the student health center or by a provider who is associated with a university-contracted external agency. This Act takes effect on July 1, 2025. Senate Substitute No. 1 for Senate Bill No. 301 differs from SB 301 as follows: - Defines the term "student." - Provides an exception for a university that does not have a student health center, including requirements that the university provide information and referral services to students and ensure that the university's health services website provides specified information relating to reproductive services. - Adds a requirement that universities maintain confidentiality of information a student provides relating to a request for a referral. - Removes references to private institutions of postsecondary education.

This Act clarifies the Attorney General’s existing authority to enforce the State’s consumer protection laws, specifically the Attorney General’s ability to pursue non-penalty civil remedies, such as damages and restitution, without having to show that a person’s violation of a law or regulation enforced by the Department of Justice’s Division of Consumer Protection was wilful. This Act does not change the requirement that the Attorney General show that such a violation was wilful in order to obtain civil penalties from a court or hearing officer. Every other state that has a similar state of mind requirement in their consumer fraud law does not impose that state of mind requirement for non-penalty civil remedies. By harmonizing the language in the Consumer Fraud Act (Subchapter II, Chapter 25, Title 6 of the Code) and the Division of Consumer Protection’s enabling statute (Subchapter II, Chapter 25, Title 29 of the Code), this Act clarifies that Delaware is line with the other states. This Act also strikes outdated language in the Consumer Fraud Act requiring cases to be filed in specific counties, as the Superior Court and the Court of Chancery have both eliminated their historical county filing requirement. Additionally, this Act fixes inconsistencies with the Summary Cease and Desist Order process, by clarifying that an alleged violator must request a hearing in order to trigger the Division of Consumer Protection’s obligation to hold a hearing. This Act further clarifies the Summary Cease and Desist Order process, such as by making explicit the alleged violator’s right to postpone a hearing and final order, changing the various 10 day requirements to 15 business days, and removing the requirement for a complaint to accompany the original summary cease and desist order.

This Act is a substitute for Senate Bill No. 174. Like Senate Bill No. 174, this Act adds Justices of the Peace, Commissioners in Superior Court, Family Court, and Court of Common Pleas, and Magistrates in Chancery to the State Judicial Pension Plan. Section 1 of this Act amends the “Pensions for Members of the State Judiciary” chapter’s definition of “state judiciary” so that Justices of the Peace, Commissioners, and Magistrates in Chancery are included, which then results in their inclusion in the definition of “member”. Section 1 also removes the defined term “for which he or she is eligible under the Federal Social Security Act”, which is not used anywhere in Chapter 56 of Title 29 of the Delaware Code (“Chapter 56”), and creates a new definition, “State judicial officer”, which is used in place of “member of the state judiciary” and “judge” in this Act. Sections 2 through 10 of this Act are included to ensure the term “member” is used consistently throughout Chapter 56 and to replace “member of the State judiciary” and “judge” with “State judicial officer”. This ensures that Justices of the Peace, Commissioners, and Magistrates in Chancery are included in the State Judicial Pension Plan. Section 2 of this Act also increases the amount of annual compensation in excess of $6,000 up to the Social Security wage base that a State judicial officer who is covered by the State Judicial Pension Plan on or after the effective date of this Act must contribute to the State Judicial Plan from 3% to 4%. Section 3 of this Act also establishes a one-time opt-out provision to allow a Justice of the Peace, Commissioner, or Magistrate in Chancery that may be adversely affected by the State Judicial Pension Plan, which would violate the Emoluments Clause under § 4 of Article XV of the Delaware Constitution, the ability to remain in the State Employee Pension Plan. Section 7 of this Act also includes in Chapter 56 reference to statutory procedures in Title 10 for the assignment of a retired Justice of the Peace or Commissioner. Like Senate Bill No. 174, this Act also does the following: (1) Makes technical corrections to conform existing law to the standards of the Delaware Legislative Drafting Manual, including (i) removing references to “or survivors” based on § 304 of Title 1 of the Delaware Code, which provides that the singular includes the plural and (ii) correcting a citation error in § 5614(g) of Title 29. (2) Makes changes to delete obsolete language, including (i) deleting § 5605(a)(2)c. of Title 29, which no longer applies to a current State judicial officer, and (ii) deleting § 5609(b), which applied for 6 months from July 7, 1998, and has not applied since then. This Act differs from Senate Bill No. 174 as follows: (1) By updating the title “Master in Chancery” to “Magistrate in Chancery”, based on the passage of Senate Bill No. 179 (152nd General Assembly). (2) By changing the definition of “Commissioner” to define the term based on the Code sections authorizing the appointment of a Commissioner, rather than the powers of a Commissioner. (3) By clarifying that a Justice of the Peace, Commissioner, or Magistrate in Chancery who qualifies for the State Judicial Pension Plan on the effective date of this Act and elects to be covered by the State Judicial Pension Plan is entitled to a payout for accrued annual leave in incremental payments over a 5-year period. (4) By renaming the title of Chapter 56, Title 29 of the Delaware Code to reflect changes made by this Act. (5) By changing the effective date of this Act to January 1, 2025.

This Act modernizes and expands the concept of maternal mental health by replacing the definition of maternal depression with the more encompassing definition of perinatal mood and anxiety disorder. This Act contemplates treatment for any caregiver who may be affected by perinatal mood and anxiety disorder. This Act avoids use of gender-based pronouns as recommended by the Legislative Drafting Manual.